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ABSTRACT
We analyse a competitive research-oriented public programme established in Spain, the Ramon y
Cajal Programme, intended to ofer contracts in public research centres to high-quality research-
ers. We study the efects of the programme on the ex post scientific productivity of its recipients,
relative to non-granted applicants with comparable curicula at the time of application. The ful
sample results demonstrate that the programme has a positive and significant efect on the
scientific productivity of the recipients, as measured both by the amount of published contribu-
tion and by the impact of their publications. Consequently, receiving a contract afects the
quantity, but also increases the quality, of the contract recipients’publications.
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I. Introduction
The Ramon y Cajal Programme (RyC programme) is a
unique targeted grant-based policy initiative–named
after the Spanish neurobiologist and joint winner of
the 1906 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine,
Santiago Ramón y Cajal–established by the Spanish
government in 2001. The programme was designed to
atract promising young researchers, both Spanish
expatriates and foreign-born, and provide incentives
to the Spanish public research centres (PRCs) to
improve their strategic planning. The grant recipients
were ofered a wel-defined career path, with a 5-year
employment contract at a Spanish PRC, and the
opportunity to obtain permanent research positions
at the end of the contract (see Sanz-Menéndez et al.
2002; Sanz-Menéndez2003).
The aim of this article is to evaluate the efect of
the RyC programme on the scientific productivity of
their beneficiaries. The programme constituted a
novel public policy measure in the Science and
Technology (S&T) system, as it shifted the system’s
focus from training to employability policies (see
Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez 2005). It has
become a relevant S&T instrument in Spain and
has atracted atention from the mass media and
professional journals (see Bosch 2001a,2001b;
Muñoz-Pinedo et al.2003) since it began.
The role of public funding in the S&T system is
grounded on the need to correct the market failure
behind the public good nature of the scientific
knowledge (Nelson1959; Arrow1962). Lack of pub-
lic funding would otherwise make its quantity to be
below the optimal social level (Benavente et al.
2012). In addition, Dasgupta and David (1994)
point out the need of public funding to yield a
balanced mix between scientific and technological
research, or between basic and applied research.
This is also the case for more innovative but riskier
research projects, in which high-quality young
researchers are usualy involved, and for which pub-
lic funding can be crucial.
Several initiatives have been implemented at the
international level to enhance the participation of
young researchers within the S&T system. The most
ambitious initiative promoted by the EU is the Marie
Skłodowska-Curie actions – Research Felowship
Program. This programme alows young researchers
to apply individualy for research felowships in EU
research centres. We can also mention several public
postdoctoral programmes in diferent countries (see
AppendixTable A1for a summary). For example,
the Emmy-Noether Programme supports researchers
with 2–4 years of postdoctoral experience in Germany.
In the Netherlands, the Netherlands Organization for
Scientific Research (NWO) provides funding to
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researchers from al nationalities under a number of
programmes. In particular, the Innovational Research
Incentives Scheme is an instrument to retain talented
researchers, ofering the Veni, Vidi and Vici grants,
which target, respectively, researchers who have just
earned their doctorates, researchers with several years
of postdoctoral experience and, finaly, experienced
researchers who have successfuly demonstrated that
they can develop their own innovative line of research.
In the UK, the Economic and Social Research Council
(ESRC) ofers the Mid-Career Development
Felowships, 2-year felowships available for established
scholars with a research experience of between 5 and
15 years. The RyC programme difers from most of
these postdoctoral programmes in its focus on employ-
ability rather than training. The Conacyt Chairs for
young researchers (Cátedras Conacyt para Jóvenes
Investigadores) in Mexico appears as the closest initia-
tive to the RyC programme, promoting researchers up
to 40 years old to join ongoing national research
projects.
There is a recent literature concerned with the
efects of public funding on scientific output.
However, it has been mostly focused on the efect
of public research grants on the scientific productiv-
ity of the research teams. Arora and Gambardela
(2005) assess the efect of NSF grants in the field of
economics on publication output, adjusted by qual-
ity, finding a positive impact for young scholars.
Jacob and Lefgren (2011), focusing on a programme
from the National Institute of Health in the US,
show smal positive impact on the number of pub-
lications and citations. Chudnovsky et al. (2008)
analyse the impact of public research grants in
Argentina, also finding positive efects on academic
performance, both in terms of the number and qual-
ity of publications. Similar findings are reported by
Carayol and Lanoe (2013) in France. Beaudry and
Alaoui (2012), focusing on research in nanotechnol-
ogy in Canada, also show that public funding to
research groups leads to more published papers.
Benavente et al. (2012), using data from a public
programme in Chile, find positive efects on the
number of publications, but not on the quality of
the scientific production. Overal, most of these
studies find some positive returns of public funding
on scientific production, in terms of quantity or
quality or both.
Our article contributes to this literature by asses-
sing the efect of the RyC programme on the scientific
productivity of applicants a few years after applica-
tion. We exploit data on applications in several cals
of the programme, provided by the Direccion General
de Investigacion of the former Ministry of Science
and Innovation.1We complement these data with
individual and curricular information on the appli-
cants. We compare successful and unsuccessful appli-
cants using two alternative empirical approaches:
linear regression and matching. Our results indicate
that contract recipients generated a larger number of
published contributions and their scientific impact
increased, measured by either the average or the
maximum impact of these contributions, with respect
to applicants who were not selected by the pro-
gramme but were comparable in accordance with
their curricula at the time of application.
To the best of our knowledge, our article is the
first evaluation of the programme’s impact on the
performance of contract recipients. However, several
previous studies have analysed other aspects of the
programme. Sanz-Menéndez et al. (2002) undertook
a descriptive study of the first cal for applications,
finding that researchers who were already in the
Spanish S&T system obtained 60% of the contracts,
while the remaining 40% of contracts were awarded
to researchers external to the Spanish S&T system
(two-thirds of whom were Spanish). Cruz-Castro
and Sanz-Menéndez (2005) use data from the first
three cals to analyse the programme’s impact on the
spread of information regarding the quality of
researchers and PRCs in Spain and ascertain how
the programme afected the organizational strategies
of the PRCs. They concluded,‘in the second cal, the
Program has earned a solid reputation abroad’and
increased the chances of those PRCs with a good
reputation to atract high-quality young researchers.
Ten years after the first cal, the Ministry of
Science and Innovation published a Results Report
entitled‘10 años del Programa Ramón y Cajal’(‘Ten
years of the Ramon y Cajal Program’, DGI2010).
1The ministerial arangements were redesigned after the March 2004 elections, and the Ministry of Science and Technology was eliminated. Its competences
were realocated to the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce and to the Ministry of Education and Science, which undertook the S&T competences,
including the Ramon y Cajal programme. Since the November 2011 elections, these competences have been the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance
and Competitiveness.
The report summarized the results of a survey of the
recipients and PRCs involved in the programme and
concluded, confirming previous findings, that the
evaluation process is generaly acknowledged to be
objective and transparent, and that the programme
has proven to be a good instrument to atract
expatriate Spanish researchers.
According to Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez
(2005), the RyC programme provided short-term relief
for the key problems of the system that it was intended
to address. Particularly it improved the employment
opportunities, working conditions and academic career
prospects of PhDs. On the supply side, the efects of
the programme‘have been pressing the PRCs to
develop strategies for human resource recruitment by
research field, and organizing their priorities in terms
of competitive research capabilities’.Overal,thepro-
fessional community has claimed that the programme
‘ofers a rare opportunity for young scientists trying to
gain a foothold in the rigid Spanish academic system’
(see Schiermeier2004). Our results alow us to con-
clude that the RyC recipients were able to achieve a
quality level above that of comparable applicants not
selected by the programme.
The remainder of the article is organized as fol-
lows. InSection II, we describe the programme and
the institutional context in which it was implemen-
ted. InSection III, we introduce the main data set of
applications and the complementary data set on the
applicants’curricular information and preliminary
results. InSection IV, we present our empirical
approach. InSection V, we evaluate the efectiveness
of the programme with respect to the scientific pro-
ductivity of successful applicants. InSection VI,we
summarize the major results and discuss their policy
implications, and conclude.
I. The Spanish S&T system and the RyC
programme
The Spanish government implemented the RyC pro-
grammein 2001 to meet the specific needs of the
Spanish S&T system. At the time it was created, the
low level of R&D investment and the scarcity of
researchers were considered two of the central pro-
blems in the Spanish S&T system. In 2001, the share
of gross domestic expenditures in R&D relative to
GDP in Spain was 0.91%, which contrasts with the
averages of 1.76% in the EU-27 and 2.27% in the
OECD. In that same year, the number of researchers
as a share of total employment in Spain amounted to
4.7 per thousand, below the EU-27 average of 5.3
and the OECD average of 6.8 per thousand (see
OECD,2007). However, R&D personnel in Spain
had been increasing rapidly: six years before, in
1995, the share of R&D personnel in total employ-
ment was only 3.5 per thousand.2As there was no
corresponding increase in R&D funding, the growth
in research personnel was primarily achieved
through the creation of precarious jobs.
To understand the emergence of this trend, we
need to consider the 1970s. At that time, the training
of new PhDs through doctoral programmes was a
political objective that became governmental policy
(Fernández Esquinas2002). Since the mid-1980s,
there was a steady increase in the availability of 4-
year public grants to fund doctoral studies (see Sanz-
Menéndez1997). As a consequence of this policy, in
2000, there were more than 60,000 PhD students in
Spain, and approximately 6000 students received
their PhD every year, these figures being three
times those at the beginning of the 1980s (see
Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez2005).
However, this increase in the supply of PhDs was
not accompanied by a similar increase in job posi-
tions for researchers. At the end of the 1990s, access
to a permanent research position or a promotion
became more dificult than had been previously.
The labour market for graduate students and experi-
enced PhDs lacked a career path. Felowships (typi-
caly tied to project funding) became the regular
labour relationship. Therefore, the Spanish labour
market for researchers in the late 1990s was char-
acterized by both a very high proportion of tempor-
ary jobs and a low expenditure per researcher (Cruz-
Castro and Sanz-Menéndez2005). The two consecu-
tive Spanish National Plans for Scientific Research,
Development and Technological Innovation, for the
2000/03 and 2004/07 periods, were explicitly pur-
posed for ‘Development of Human Resources’
(OCT 1999, 12; CICIT2003, 17), with the hiring
and recruitment of highly skiled professionals in
2According to Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez (2005), part of this increase might be due to statistical adjustment. Since 2000, doctoral and postdoctoral
personnel with felowships (but not contracts) are counted as researchers.
public and private research centres among their
objectives.
The RyC programme was born to be one of the
instruments to fulfil the objectives of the 2000/03
and 2004/07 National Plans. In particular, the objec-
tives atributed to the programme were specificaly
established as folows. First, to ameliorate the work-
ing conditions and long-term employment prospects
of a sizeable stock of postdoctoral researchers, within
the S&T system, lacking wel-defined career paths.
Second, to atract numerous Spanish PhD graduates
with high-quality scientific records who, at that time,
were working abroad. The programme provided
postdoctoral researchers with a point of entry to
the Spanish S&T system in the form of a 5-year
contract that mimics a tenure-track position.3
The programme was also intended to provide the
PRCs with incentives to align their strategic priori-
ties with their human resources practices. This was
implemented by establishing a financial co-respon-
sibility scheme between the PRCs and the govern-
ment. This scheme discouraged the PRCs from
training and increasing the stock of researchers
without a wel-defined career path who were seeking
the opportunity to hold positions within the system
(Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez2005). Another
concern, held both by legislators and in the public
arena, was the need to eliminate the favouritism that
prevailed in Spanish PRCs (see Bosch2001b). This
concern was crucial in determining the selection
procedures accomplished in the programme.
When the RyC programme was launched in 2001,
there was a pervasive perception, spread by the mass
media, of a significant brain drain on the Spanish
S&T system and a belief that many Spanish PhD
graduates working abroad could be enticed to return
if they were provided with improved career oppor-
tunities. At the same time, a large amount of high-
quality young researchers were already in the
Spanish R&D system under temporary positions
(Alonso-Borrego et al.2013)
The first cal for applications by the RyC pro-
gramme atracted approximately 2800 applicants
and ofered 800 contracts, with a total annual
expenditure of 35 milion euros. The recipients
would receive a 5-year contract with an annual
wage of nearly 29,000 euros, similar to the wage of
a newly tenured professor (‘profesor titular’)in
Spanish PRCs. In the second and third cals, in
2002 and 2003, 500 and 700 contracts were ofered,
respectively, atracting more than 2500 applications
in each cal.4 The number of contracts ofered
decreased substantialy after 2003.
To ensure a transparent selection process and pre-
vent the possibility of favouritism, the selection pro-
cedure was centralized in an evaluation agency, the
‘Agencia Nacional de Evaluación y Prospectiva’
(ANEP). This procedure, centralized and external to
the PRCs, was a novel feature of the public policy’s
design. Its success relied on the involvement of the
PRCs, which agreed to be excluded from the selection
process while co-financing the hiring of the selected
researchers. Despite its transparency, candidate elig-
ibility was subject to the endorsement of the PRCs in
the first two cals: applicants were required to obtain
an endorsement leter from at least one PRC, which
commited the PRC to hire her if selected. This fea-
ture atracted international atention (see Bosch
2001b), and Anna Birulés, then the Minister of
Science and Technology, reported that some PRCs
were jeopardizing the programme by only endorsing
local candidates. This endorsement requirement, the
efects of which were analysed by Alonso-Borrego
et al. (2013), became optional in the 2003 cal and
was completely eliminated in the 2004 cal.
The ANEP appraised al eligible researchers through
a peer-review process, primarily based on the candi-
dates’scientific records but also on their potential
prospects.5For this purpose, the evaluation agency
formed 24 evaluation commitees comprising national
and international experts, one for each research field.
The evaluation commitees were entrusted to rank the
candidates, yet the alocation of contracts among
research areas was determined ex post by a selection
commitee appointed by thegovernment. Such aloca-
tion was determined on technical grounds while
accounting for the priorities established by the
National R&D and Innovation Plan, as wel as the
3This programme was complemented with the Juan de la Cierva programme, oriented to researchers in an earlier stage of their career. It gave the possibility
to researchers within 3 years after their PhD to join a research group in Spain for 3 years.
4See Alonso-Borego et al. (2013). It must be noted that applicants could apply to several areas, and hence the number of applications was even higher.
However, most applicants, especialy in the first cal, only submited a single application.
5In the first three cals (2001–2003), the curicular merits of the candidate accounted for 70% of the assessment, while the candidate’s submited scientific
proposal and other merits (such as research stays in outstanding centres and leters of reference) each accounted for 15%.
demands of the diferent PRCs and the relative quality
of researchers according to international standards (see
Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez2005).
Four years after each cal, the performance of each
programme recipient during the benefit period was
evaluated by the ANEP on the basis of her scientific
contributions generated until then. A positive eva-
luation implied the possibility of receiving a new
contract that facilitated her access to a tenured con-
tract at the PRC. According to the Ministry of
Science and Innovation, more than 90% of the reci-
pients reached permanent positions when the RyC
contracts finish. Among them, more than 85% stay
at the same PRC that host them under the RyC
programme (DGI2010).
Finaly, there is evidence of an inflow of new
hiring in the Spanish R&D system during our period
of study. Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez (2015)
show that‘between 1998/99 and 2010/11, the stock
of academic staf in Spanish public universities
increased by almost 29,100 (from 79,700 to
108,800)’. In the first 10 cals of the RyC programme,
between 2001 and 2010, the number of diferent
applicants amounted to 11,658 researchers (DGI
2010), a figure much below the aforementioned
increase of researchers in public universities. In
fact, in the Spanish Public S&T system, researchers
within PRCs are much likely to stay within them.
Sanz-Menéndez, Cruz-Castro, and Alva (2013) point
out that‘our system is similar to some others (e.g.,
Canada) characterized by an association between
permanence and tenure (Stewart, Ornstein, and
Drakich2009) in which virtualy al academics that
stay in an institution eventualy get tenure’. This
feature, together with the huge increase in the staf
of researchers during the period, suggests that most
of the RyC beneficiaries and their comparable non-
successful applicants (those with comparable CVs at
the time of application) were linked to PRCs and
remained linked to them at least during these years.
II. Preliminary evidence on the programme
The main data set, provided by the Dirección General
deInvestigación of the Spanish Ministry of Education,
records al applications during the first seven cals of
the programme, from 2001 to 2007. We excluded
observations with missing values for individual char-
acteristics, which represent less than 1% of al obser-
vations. Information on each applicant includes her
research area, the institution and year in which she
earned her PhD, her country of residence and nation-
ality, and the score received in the assessment process
and whether she was granted a contract. We concen-
trate our analysis on the second and the third cals, in
2002 and 2003, for the folowing reasons. First, the
first cal, in 2001, presents several particular character-
istics, which might reduce the comparability of its
applications with those of subsequent cals (Alonso-
Borrego et al.2013). Second, the eligibility conditions,
which were similar in 2002 and 2003, were changed in
2004.6
InTable 1, we provide the distribution of applica-
tions and contracts for these 2 years, broken down
by gender, PhD tenure and research area. The sam-
ple has been restricted to those applicants who
applied to a single area. Furthermore, we have
excluded applications on arts & humanities, given
that during the period considered disciplines in this
area hardly folowed international standards.
Consequently, we have chosen 22 out of the 24
original areas designated by the ANEP. These 22
areas have been aggregated into nine broader areas.7
The first six areas correspond to experimental dis-
ciplines (physics, earth sciences, chemistry, agricul-
ture, biomedical and engineering), folowed by
mathematics, economics and social sciences & law.
Experimental sciences account for more than 85%
of applications and more than 90% of contracts. The
reason for this alocation of contracts across research
areas are the R&D priorities established in the
National R&D and Innovation Plan.
We observe that applications are dominated by
men. The gender distribution across research areas
(not reported here) is highly unequal. Physics and
engineering are strongly dominated by men,
amounting to 80% of applicants. In chemistry, men
represent approximately 60% of applicants.
However, social sciences and biomedical sciences
are balanced in terms of gender. With respect to
6Until 2003, applicants were required to have a PhD and a minimum of an 18-month research stay, at a research centre other than that from which the
applicant’s colege degree was obtained. Since 2004, applicants were required to have earned their PhD in the last 10 years and a minimum 2 years
postdoctoral stay in a diferent research centre than that from which her PhD was obtained.
7The corespondence with the areas designated by the ANEP is reported in AppendixTable A2.
the time elapsed since receiving their PhD, the
majority of applicants earned their PhD within 3–
6 years before the cal. Additionaly, the success rate
is higher for men than for women.
The curricular information has been colected
from a complementary data source, the free online
resource Publish or Perish (Harzing2007). Publish
or Perish retrieves academic contributions by author
using the Google Scholar database, which provides
the title, source, year and authors of the contribu-
tion. Google Scholar is generaly praised for its speed
(Bosman et al.2006) and high correlation with alter-
native bibliometric sources (see Harzing2013; and
Harzing and van der Wal2008; for a comparison of
citation analyses using diferent data sources).
Whenever the contribution was published in a scien-
tific journal, the journal information is also reported.
For each applicant, we measure her number of dis-
tinct contributions and, among these, the number of
published papers.
To assess the quality of each contribution, we use
the Journal of Citation Reports (JCR), which pro-
vides the impact factors of the international journals
listed in its database. A journal’s impact factor is
calculated on the basis of the average number of
citations received by the contributions published in
that journal. We use the JCR impact factors in 2006
to measure both the quality of each candidate and
the quality of the centre from which each candidate
earned her PhD, defined as the average number of
citations to al the contributions published in JCR
journals by al researchers afiliated with the centre.
We consider the journal impact factors from a single
year to guarantee the comparability between contri-
butions published in diferent years. The curricular
information is updated until 2007.
We use three measures of the scientific quality of
each applicant: her number of contributions listed in
the JCR database, the average impact factor of her
JCR publications and the maximum impact factor
among the JCR journals in which she has published.
The two impact factor measures are based on the
corresponding impact of the journal in which she
published each contribution.
InTable 2A, we summarize the curricular infor-
mation of applicants at the time of application by
contract status, reporting the mean and SD, as wel
as the sample median, the 75th and the 90th quan-
tiles. Furthermore, we break down the sample by
two applicants’characteristics: gender and time
elapsed since PhD receipt.8For al categories con-
sidered, we observe that, at the time of the cal,
contract recipients have, on average, more published
contributions and a greater scientific impact (either
average or maximum impact) than non-recipients.
Interestingly, we find that the mean and the distri-
bution quantiles of these three quality measures are
slightly higher for women than for men. We have
performed mean comparison tests of the three qual-
ity measures between granted and non-granted
applicants for the whole sample, as wel as spliting
the sample by gender and by PhD tenure. In al
cases, the diferences are statisticaly significant at
the usual levels.
InTable 2B, we summarize the curricular informa-
tion of applicants at the time of application by contract
status and by research areas. Regarding our measures
of the applicants’scientific quality, the empirical dis-
tributions difer substantialy depending on the con-
tract status. Specificaly, those receiving a contract tend
tohavealargernumberofpapersandagreaterimpact
than those without a contract. The mean comparison
tests we have performed of the three quality measures
between granted and non-granted applicants show sta-
tisticaly significant diferences at the usual levels in al
Table 1.Distribution of applications and contracts: absolute
and relative (%) frequencies in each category.
Applications Contracts
2876 879
Gender
Female 1167 42.6 302 36.0
Male 1574 57.4 537 64.0
PhD tenure (years)
Up to 2 677 24.7 157 18.9
3–6 1248 45.6 415 49.8
More than 6 812 29.7 261 31.3
Research area
Physics 249 8.7 66 7.5
Earth sciences & ecology 320 11.1 90 10.2
Chemistry 498 17.3 186 21.2
Agriculture, livestock and fishery 349 12.1 90 10.2
Biomedical sciences 815 28.3 261 29.7
Engineering & computing sciences 263 9.1 113 12.9
Mathematics 117 4.1 28 3.2
Economics 84 2.9 21 2.4
Social sciences & law 181 6.3 24 2.7
Data from the second (2002) and third (2003) cals.
Sample of applicants who applied to a single area.
8The estimation results in Alonso-Borego et al. (2013) indicate that applicant’s curiculum, measured by the average impact factor of her contributions, the
scientific quality of the centre from which she earned her PhD, and her PhD tenure, increase the probability of receiving a contract.
Table 2.Curicular information at time of application by contract status (yes/no)–means, SDs and quantiles of the empirical
distribution: (A) by gender and PhD tenure and (B) by research areas.
Number of papers Average IF Maximum IF Rank Average IF Rank Maximum IF
Al Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
(A)
Mean 2.3 1.3 1.9 1.1 3.3 1.7 37.5 25.8 40.1 27.9
SD (4.1) (2.9) (3.3) (2.1) (6.6) (4.1) (41.8) (36.8) (44.4) (39.5)
q50 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1 1 1
q75 3 1 2.9 1.7 4.3 2.0 86 64 93 72
q90 7 5 5.4 3.6 7.9 5.3 95 89 98 95
Female Mean 2.5 1.6 2.2 1.2 4.2 2.0 42.1 29.2 44.7 31.3
SD (4.3) (3.2) (3.2) (2.2) (7.6) (4.5) (43.0) (38.7) (45.4) (41.3)
q50 0 0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 1 1 1
q75 4 2 3.6 2.3 5.2 2.8 88 72 94 82
q90 7 5 6.1 3.9 10.9 5.8 96 92 99 97
Male Mean 2.1 1.2 1.7 0.9 2.9 1.5 35.5 23.3 37.8 25.3
SD (4.0) (2.7) (3.3) (2.9) (5.9) (3.9) (41.0) (35.2) (43.7) (38.0)
q50 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1 1 1
q75 3 1 2.6 1.3 3.8 1.4 81 54 90 64
q90 6 4 5.2 3.5 7.7 4.9 95 87 98 94
≤2 years Mean 0.9 0.6 1.3 0.6 1.8 0.8 25.9 16.4 26.9 17.4
SD (2.2) (1.9) (3.3) (1.8) (5.2) (2.3) (37.8) (31.0) (39.1) (32.8)
q50 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1 1 1
q75 1 0 1.3 0.0 1.3 0.0 62 1 63 1
q90 3 2 3.5 2.2 4.7 2.8 94 78.5 95 85
3–6 years Mean 2.3 1.2 2.1 1.1 3.7 1.6 39.7 26.6 42.3 28.5
SD (3.7) (2.5) (3.6) (2.1) (6.9) (3.9) (42.2) (37.2) (44.6) (39.7)
q50 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1 1 1
q75 3 1 3.1 1.8 4.5 2.3 87 65 94 73
q90 7 4 6.1 3.9 10.4 5.4 95 89 99 95
>6 years Mean 2.9 2.1 2.0 1.5 3.7 2.6 41.4 33.1 44.5 36.3
SD (4.9) (3.8) (2.7) (2.4) (6.9) (5.6) (42.6) (39.2) (45.5) (42.5)
q50 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 1 1 1
q75 4 3 3.5 2.7 4.9 3.8 88 77 94 88
q90 8 6 5.5 4.2 7.8 6.1 95 93 98 97
(B)
Physics Mean 1.7 0.8 2.1 0.8 2.6 1.1 39.8 21.6 42.0 22.8
SD (2.4) (1.8) (3.1) (1.7) (4.4) (2.3) (42.5) (35.7) (44.2) (37.4)
q50 0.5 0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 4.5 1 4.5 1
q75 3 1 4.1 0.9 5.4 0.9 92 41 94 41
q90 5 3 5.8 3.7 7.1 5.4 95 90 97 94
Earth sciences Mean 2.2 1.4 1.6 0.9 2.5 1.5 37.4 28.4 40.7 31.0
SD (3.6) (2.9) (3.4) (1.4) (4.8) (3.7) (42.1) (37.3) (45.6) (40.3)
q50 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1 1 1
q75 4 2 2.4 1.7 3.4 1.9 81 68 93 76
q90 7.5 5 3.7 2.8 6.3 4.2 95 90 98 94
Chemistry Mean 2.8 1.6 1.8 1.0 2.7 1.4 43.5 28.0 47.0 30.4
SD (4.0) (3.0) (2.6) (1.5) (4.0) (2.3) (40.4) (36.4) (43.3) (39.2)
q50 1 0 1.6 0.0 1.6 0.0 59.5 1 69.5 1
q75 5 2 2.9 2.5 4.3 2.8 82 67 91 73.5
q90 8 5 4.1 3.6 7.7 4.5 93 84 96 93
Agriculture Mean 2.1 1.5 1.6 1.2 2.8 1.8 48.8 36.4 50.8 37.4
SD (3.1) (3.1) (2.4) (2.0) (5.5) (3.9) (45.3) (43.9) (46.8) (45.1)
q50 1 0 1.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 67.5 1 69 1
q75 3 2 2.6 2.1 3.4 2.5 97 90 99 97
q90 5.5 4 3.9 3.4 5.8 4.8 99 99 99 99
Biomedical Mean 3.2 2.1 3.2 1.9 6.4 3.2 41.5 32.6 44.1 36.2
SD (5.7) (3.8) (4.3) (3.1) (9.7) (6.3) (44.1) (38.8) (46.7) (42.6)
q50 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1 1 1
q75 5 3 5.4 3.4 8.1 4.9 90 77 95 88
q90 8 7 8.8 4.9 26.7 8.0 95 89 99 96
Engineering Mean 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 15.8 8.3 16.1 8.8
SD (0.9) (0.8) (0.9) (0.6) (1.2) (0.8) (31.3) (21.8) (32.5) (23.0)
q50 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1 1 1
q75 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 1 1 1
q90 1 1 1.4 0.5 1.6 0.6 79 36.5 89 43.5
Mathematics Mean 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 23.5 13.7 25.9 15.4
SD (2.0) (1.2) (0.5) (0.3) (0.5) (0.4) (30.1) (23.0) (32.8) (26.3)
q50 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1 1 1
q75 1.5 1 0.6 0.0 0.7 0.4 41.5 24 57.5 24
q90 5 2 1.2 0.7 1.2 0.9 80 55 83 67
Economics Mean 2.0 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.9 0.5 39.9 18.6 46.0 19.8
(Continued)
areas, with the only exceptions of the number of JCR
papers in agriculture and engineering and the maxi-
mum impact factor in mathematics and economics.
We also find that the three measures of scientific
quality difer substantialy byarea, reflecting diferences
in the typical number of papers and citations across
research fields, and therefore the impact indices are
not comparable across areas. To provide a measure of
scientific impact that permits comparisons across areas,
we constructed the relative rank or position of each
researcher with respect to the empirical distribution of
impactsofalJCRjournalsinherresearcharea. We
computed the quantile (between 1 and 99) of the corre-
sponding empirical distribution of the journal impact
achieved by each researcher given her average and her
maximum impact factor, which we have denoted‘rank
average IF’and‘rank maximum IF’, respectively. For
instance, a researcher who published a paper in the
journal with the highest impact in her area would have
a rank maximum IF of 99.
The evidence of a larger number of papers as wel as
a greater impact achieved by contract recipients agrees
with the criteria established by the commitees in the
selection of applicants, which emphasize their scientific
quality. However, we observe that for contract recipi-
ents the median number of papers and the impact at
the time of application is zero in most areas. We believe
that selection commitees were taking other quality
features into consideration at the moment of applica-
tion that are unobserved in our data set. Specificaly,
we have measured each applicant’s scientific merits
using her contributions published in JCR journals up
to the year of application. However, unlike the
selection commitee, we cannot observe papers under
revision, forthcoming papers (not yet published in the
year of the cal) and, to a lesser extent, the quality of the
candidate’s research agenda, among others. For most
areas, we observe strong diferences by contract status
for the highest quartile of the distribution. In terms of
both the average and maximum impact, the highest
quartile of researchers with a contract achieve high
positions within the impact distribution in their corre-
sponding area, approaching ranks above 85 in al
experimental disciplines except engineering. These dis-
ciplines amount to 75% of al contracts. In economics,
the highest quartile of researchers rank above 65. The
patern is substantialy diferent in mathematics and
social sciences & law.
For researchers without a contract, we observe
that, in experimental disciplines except engineering,
the highest decile of researchers without a contract
rank at least 85 in experimental disciplines. This
evidence suggests that we can identify a suficient
number of researchers without contracts that are
comparable, in terms of our curricular measures,
with researchers with contracts. In the case of eco-
nomics, the highest decile of researchers without a
contract are at least ranked by almost 80. For engi-
neering, mathematics and social sciences & law, the
highest decile of researchers without a contract rank
much lower. This suggest that, in terms of curricular
quality, the number of available comparable research-
ers to contract recipients might be much smaler in
these areas. This finding might be evidence that most
researchers in certain non-experimental disciplines
have yet to adapt to international standards.9
Table 2.(Continued).
Number of papers Average IF Maximum IF Rank Average IF Rank Maximum IF
Al Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
SD (2.0) (1.1) (0.9) (0.9) (1.0) (1.2) (34.2) (30.3) (36.4) (32.3)
q50 1 0 0.6 0.0 0.8 0.0 38 1 53 1
q75 4 1 1.0 0.4 1.0 0.4 65 23 67 23
q90 5 2 1.8 1.4 2.4 1.6 88 79 94 84
Social sciences Mean 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.1 17.0 7.7 19.2 8.0
SD (1.2) (0.6) (1.2) (0.4) (1.5) (0.4) (30.9) (20.0) (34.8) (20.9)
q50 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1 1 1
q75 0.5 0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 15 1 15 1
q90 2 1 1.1 0.4 3.0 0.5 63 32 97 33
qjis thejth percentile of the empirical distribution of the coresponding outcome variable.
9Jiménez-Contreras, de Moya Anegón, and Delgado López-Cózar (2003) analyse the impact of the national evaluation of researchers’activity in Spain on their
research output. They find that‘preference wil be given to those articles which are published in journals of recognized prestige that is to say, those
journals which occupy a notable position in the lists, organized by scientific field, which appear in the Subject Category Listing of the Journal Citation
Reports of the Science Citation Index (Institute of Scientific Information, Philadelphia, PA, USA)’. These criteria are applied to al the research areas except
arts & humanities and law,‘which use alternative criteria’.
The results suggest the quality of the researchers
selected and the existence of comparable candidates
in most of the research areas considered. However,
as reported inTable 2B, the areas of social sciences
& law and engineering exhibit a shortage of high-
quality candidates, as reflected, relative to other
areas, by the smaler number of papers and the
worse ranking in the highest quartile of the distribu-
tion of impacts, regardless of the outcome of the
application process.
IV. Empirical approach
We consider the scientific output of applicants in the
four years after the cal to assess the impact of con-
tract status on the ex post performance of research-
ers. Given the data constraints, we consider the time
horizon selected to be suficient to test the potential
influence of the contract. Moreover, it is consistent
with the usual time span the PRCs take to make
tenure decisions, and with the maximum length of
time required for scientific contributions to undergo
a peer-reviewed publication process.
Our relevant policy variable is a binary variableDi
indicating whether the individual was granted a RyC
contract, which takes on 1 if the researcherihas
been awarded a contract and 0 otherwise. Our con-
cern is whether the contract status afects the
researcher’s productivity outcomeYiin the 4-year
period after the cal. We perform the analysis using
three alternative outcome variables that measure
researchers’scientific performance. These variables
are the number of contributions published in jour-
nals listed in the JCR, the average impact of such
contributions and the maximum impact factor
among the JCR journals in which a researcher has
published. Additionaly, to ease the comparability
across areas, we construct the aforementioned nor-
malized impact variables for average and maximum
impact, respectively, which consist on the rank or
relative position that each researcher would achieve
in her research area using the empirical distribution
of the impacts of the journals in such area.
For individuali, her causal efect would result
from the diference between its two potential out-
comes depending on whether she received a contract
or did not, denoted asY1iandY0i, respectively. If
both counterfactual outcomes were observed, the
treatment efect, i.e. the impact of the contract for
researcheri, would simply beY1i Y0ið Þ. UsingE(.)
to denote the mean operator, we could then calculate
the average impact of the contract on the population,
or the average treatment efect (ATE), as
EY1i Y0ið Þ(see Rosenbaum and Rubin1983), or,
concentrating on the subpopulation of contract reci-
pients, the average treatment efect on the treated
(ATT)EY1i Y0ijDi¼1ð Þ. However, it is wel
known that as receiving and not receiving a contract
are mutualy exclusive, for each researcher we only
observe eitherDi=1orDi= 0, and therefore we
only observe her outcome under one of the two
situations, i.e.
Yi¼Y0iþ Y1i Y0ið ÞDi: (1)
If the contract status were purely random, and
thus independent of the potential outcomes, then
the three evaluation measures would be equivalent,
EY1i Y0ið Þ¼EY1i Y0ijDi¼1ð Þ
¼EY1i Y0ijDi¼0ð Þ (2)
and hence, the average efect of the contract would
simply beEY1ijDi¼1ð Þ EY0ijDi¼0ð Þ. In this
case, a naive mean-diference estimator based on
the sample means of the observed outcomes for
recipients and non-recipients would consistently
estimate the causal efect of the contract. This result
also holds under the weaker assumption of mean
independence between the contract and the potential
outcomes.
However, we know that contract status depends
on researchers’characteristics, and therefore,
researchers’potential outcomesY1i,Y0iare not inde-
pendent of the contract statusDi. To see this, notice
that the observed diference in outcomes between
recipients and non-recipients can be writen as
EY1ijDi¼1ð Þ EY0ijDi¼0ð Þ
¼ATTþEY0ijDi¼1ð Þ EY0ijDi¼0ð Þ½ (3)
where the second term on the right-hand side of the
equation measures the potential selection bias aris-
ing because of the diferential performance of reci-
pients and non-recipients even in the absence of the
contract. Presumably, a naive mean-diference esti-
mator is expected to exacerbate the positive impact
of the contract as contract recipients are likely to be
more productive than non-recipients even in the
absence of the contract.
As potential outcomes are not independent of
contract status, identification requires the availability
of individual pre-contract information and assump-
tions regarding the relationship between contract
status and potential outcomes, conditional on such
additional information. The main idea is that con-
tract status is purely random for individuals with
similar pre-contract information. We consider two
alternative approaches: parametric (regression) and
non-parametric (matching). We first describe the
problem in the regression framework to ilustrate
how we can circumvent selection bias by exploiting
additional information.
We can write the observed outcome for researcher
ias a simple linear projection on the contract status,
Yi¼αþρDiþui (4)
where the slopeρis the ATE anduicaptures the
unobserved deviation of the potential outcomes of
researcheri. The simple OLS estimator ofρin (4)
yields the aforementioned naive mean-diference
estimator based on the sample means of the
observed outcome for recipients and non-recipients.
This estimator would consistently estimate the ATE
provided that the error term is mean-independent of
contract status, i.e.EðuijDiÞ¼0. However, we
should expect a selection bias between recipients
and non-recipients,EðuijDi¼1ÞEðuijDi¼0Þas
recipients are expected to be more productive than
non-recipients.
The availability of additional variables that con-
tain pre-contract information might alow to cir-
cumvent this selection bias. LetXibe a vector of
additional covariates, including the researcher’s cur-
ricular information and other relevant variables at
the time of application. Consider the assumption
that, conditional on the covariates included inXi,
the potential outcomes are mean-independent of
Di, i.e.
EYjiDi;Xi¼EYjiXi j¼0;1: (5)
This conditional mean-independence assumption
is also caled‘selection on observables’as it states
thatXidetermines contract status. We also need to
assume parametric specifications for the conditional
expectations, givenDiandXi, of the unobserved
individual deviations of the potential outcomes for
recipients and non-recipients. Under such assump-
tions, we can write the augmented model as
Yi¼αþρDiþβ0Xiþγ0DiXiþui: (6)
where nowEuijDi;Xið Þ¼0. It can be seen that the
causal efect for researcheriis equal toρþγ0Xi,
meaning that it varies with the values of the con-
ditioning variables. To calculate the ATE, we must
evaluate this expression atEXið Þ, while to calculate
the ATT, it must be evaluated atEXijDi¼1ð Þ(see
Wooldridge 2002). Under the above assumptions,
OLS estimation of (6) wil yield a consistent estimate
of the impact of the contract.
As an alternative to regression analysis, we can
folow a non-parametric approach and produce
matching estimators of the impact of the contract,
using the individual pre-contract information men-
tioned above. If, for individuals with similar pre-
contract information, contract status can be consid-
ered as purely random, we can estimate the corre-
sponding counterfactual outcome for each contract
recipient using the average outcome for non-recipi-
ents with similar pre-contract information.
Matching estimators rely on a stronger version of
the selection on observables assumption, by which,
conditional onXi, treatment status is independent of
potential outcomes (see Rosenbaum and Rubin
1983). However, unlike regression analysis, matching
estimators do not require parametric assumptions.
The conditional independence assumption alows us
to analyse our observational data as if they came
from a randomized experiment.
Folowing Abadie and Imbens (2011), we imple-
ment bias-corrected matching estimators, which
employ a regression adjustment to circumvent the
finite-sample bias that arises when the matching is
not exact. The matches are directly based on the
same curricular covariates used in the regression.
There are two reasons why we do not employ a
propensity score approach to match treatment and
comparison observations. First, given the smal
number of covariates, we do not have a serious
dimensionality problem. Second, and more impor-
tant, propensity score matching is based on first-
step estimates of the unknown propensity score. It
is dificult to derive the asymptotic variance of the
matching estimator when estimated propensity
scores, instead of (unknown) actual propensity
scores, are used (see Abadie and Imbens2009).
Moreover, the standard bootstrap variance
employed in empirical work is not appropriate
(Abadie and Imbens2008). Abadie and Imbens
(2011) derive the asymptotic variance for the bias-
corrected matching estimator that we use, which is
implemented in a Stata routine that is fuly docu-
mented in Abadie et al. (2004).
We have ruled out a regression discontinuity
approach after analysing the alocation process of
contracts and the data themselves. The major pitfal
to implement this procedure is that the assumption
of an exogenous rule of assignment does not hold.
Namely, there is not an ex ante cut-of such that the
score provided by the selection commitees in each
area determine the contract alocation. Instead, as we
have mentioned earlier, the cut-of in each area is
endogenously determined after the selection com-
mitee establishes the number of contracts to be
alocated to each area.
V. The performance of RyC researchers
We estimate the causal efects of the contract, con-
ditional on researcher characteristics at the time of
application, to overcome the selection bias due to the
endogeneity of contract status. The validity of the
conditional estimates of the causal efects relies on
the absence of unobserved diferences across
researchers associated with contract status that afect
their potential outcomes. The covariates we consider
in the empirical analysis are related to the research-
er’s curricular information at the time of application,
the time elapsed since PhD receipt and her research
area. We consider alternative parametric (regression)
and non-parametric (matching) procedures using
this set of conditioning variables. Regarding the
researcher’s curricular information, we use the num-
ber of JCR papers and the average impact factor. We
use a second-order polynomial on these two vari-
ables and the cross-product between them. Our mea-
sure of causal efect is the ATT, which measures the
average efect of the contract for those researchers
who actualy had a contract. For the sake of compar-
ison, we also calculate the naive unconditional esti-
mates of the impact of the contract in (4), which
presumably tend to overestimate the causal efect of
the contract on scientific productivity.
In addition to the curricular information of the
applicant at the time of application, we also condi-
tion on the score achieved by the candidate in the
assessment process. While this score is expected to
be correlated with the aforementioned curricular
information at the time of application, it is also likely
to capture further information available to the
assessment commitee but diferent than our
observed measures of candidate’s quality, such as
papers under revision, forthcoming papers and the
quality of her research agenda.
The main outcomes that we consider to measure
scientific productivity in the 4-year period after the
application are the number of JCR papers published
by the researcher and the scientific impact measure
of her JCR contributions during that period. As
impact measures, we use the aforementioned average
and maximum impact factors, as wel as the corre-
sponding normalized measures that yield the rank or
relative position that each researcher would achieve
within her research area with respect to the empiri-
cal distribution of impact of the journals in that area,
measured by the percentile that the researcher would
reach within this empirical impact distribution.
InTable 3, we report the conditional regression
estimates for our five outcome variables. In al cases,
theR2is above 40%, showing that the curricular
measures at the time of application provide a sub-
stantial explanatory power. The polynomial in the
number of published papers and the average impact
factor exhibits a significant efect, with both vari-
ables showing a positive but marginaly decreasing
efect. The logarithm of the score, however, is only
significant for the number of papers. As part of the
diferential information of the score with respect to
the observed curricular information might include
papers under revision, its negative efect might be
reflecting the failure of part of this potential research
in geting published. Finaly, the PhD tenure has a
negative efect for young PhDs, but this efect turns
out positive for higher PhD tenures.
InTable 4, we report the estimates of the impact
of the contract for contract recipients, using the
unconditional (naive) estimators, the conditional
regression estimators presented inTable 3, and the
matching estimators. The naive estimates are both
positive and significant for every outcome consid-
ered. These estimates may sufer from a positive
selection bias, which is confirmed by the conditional
estimates (both regression and matching) of the
causal efects, which employ the researchers’pre-
contract characteristics as covariates. Although both
the conditional regression and the matching
estimates are positive too, their magnitudes are
much lower than the naive estimates. Further, the
magnitudes of the regression and matching estimates
are very similar, yet matching estimates tend to be
higher. For al of the quantity (the number of JCR
papers) and the quality (impact) measures, the ATT
is positive and significant. These results indicate that
the contract would have, on average, a positive efect
on both the quantity and quality of the scientific
production of a randomly chosen applicant. Using
either of the two rank measures, we find that, on
average, the receipt of a contract causes recipients to
shift 4 percentiles upwards within the impact
distribution.
InTable 5, we have calculated the causal efects
(in percentages) of the contract on each outcome
variable, using the sample average of the corre-
sponding outcome at the time of application.
Looking at regression and matching estimates, con-
tract recipients produce on average between 20%
and 26% papers more than in the absence of the
contract, and increase their average impact by
between 15% and 17%, and their maximum impact
by between 10% and 15%.
Our results contribute to the empirical literature
on the efects of public funding on scientific produc-
tivity. In the same fashion that it has been found a
positive efect of public funding on the scientific
productivity of research groups, we find a positive
and significant efect of publicly funded contracts on
the scientific productivity of young researchers.
We have also considered alternative estimates,
using alternative conditioning sets and a longer
time span after the application, to evaluate the sen-
sitivity of the results. Specificaly, we have consid-
ered additional conditioning variables, such as
gender, as wel as the inclusion of the maximum IF
among the curricular measures and diferent degrees
of the polynomial in the curricular measures. The
results (not reported here but available upon
Table 3.Regression results (ATT).
Number of papers Average IF Maximum IF Rank average IF Rank maximum IF
Contract 0.445*** 0.290*** 0.323* 3.639** 3.906**
(0.168) (0.104) (0.190) (1.480) (1.553)
log(score) –0.393*** –0.060 –0.143 –0.289 –0.484
(0.188) (0.089) (0.140) (1.732) (1.831)
CV (at year of application)
No. of papers 0.788*** 0.239*** 0.322** 8.560*** 10.144 ***
(0.156) (0.060) (0.153) (0.823) (0.874)
Average IF 0.175** 0.465*** 0.594*** 10.378*** 10.692***
(0.094) (0.117) (0.141) (1.166) (1.213)
No. of papers*Average IF –0.005 0.017 0.102*** –0.506*** –0.624***
(0.029) (0.011) (0.030) (0.100) (0.104)
No. of papers2 0.001 –0.012*** –0.016 –0.259*** –0.296***
(0.012) (0.004) (0.010) (0.047) (0.049)
Average IF2 –0.009* –0.012 –0.027*** –0.338*** –0.346***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.062) (0.064)
PhD tenure
No. of years since PhD –0.174*** –0.058*** –0.107*** –1.788*** –1.929***
(0.036) (0.015) (0.028) (0.357) (0.368)
No. of years since PhD2 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.061*** 0.065***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) (0.017)
Constant 2.359*** 0.794** 1.351*** 15.877** 17.370**
(0.771) (0.373) (0.586) (7.544) (7.969)
No. of observations 2734 2734 2734 2734 2734
R2 0.504 0.460 0.421 0.466 0.485
Robust SEs in parentheses.
Binary variables for research areas included in al estimations.
*, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 4.Ful sample estimates of the causal efect of the
contract (ATT).
Naive Regression Matching
Outcome
Number of papers 0.99*** 0.44*** 0.60***
(0.19) (0.17) (0.16)
Average IF 0.71*** 0.29*** 0.32***
(0.12) (0.10) (0.11)
Maximum IF 1.16*** 0.32* 0.51***
(0.20) (0.19) (0.19)
Rank average IF 10.84*** 3.64** 3.89**
(1.64) (1.48) (1.78)
Rank maximum IF 11.54*** 3.91** 3.80**
(1.74) (1.55) (1.89)
See notes toTable 3.
Matching procedure is implemented with replacement, using four matches
per observation, and the Mahalanobis metric to measure the distance
among covariate values.
request) can be summarized as folows. We find that
the gender was not significant and did not increase
the explanatory power of the regression estimates,
and the estimated causal efects remain similar.10
Moreover, the selection of either the curricular mea-
sures or the functional form does not alter the main
empirical results. When we considered the longer 5-
year time span after the application, the qualitative
results are unchanged.11However, as we were only
able to gather curricular information until 2007, we
can only use applicant data from 2002, and hence
the precision of the estimates is reduced. Overal,
our results appear to be robust to the choice of
conditioning variables, functional form and time
span after application. We have also considered
separate estimation by research areas. The major
qualitative results remain, yet estimates become
much more imprecise due to the smal sample size.12
VI. Conclusions
The RyC programme constituted a novel policy
measure and has become a relevant S&T instrument
in Spain. The programme was designed to improve
the working conditions and long-term employment
prospects of a sizeable stock of postdoctoral
researchers within the S&T system and atract
numerous Spanish PhD graduates with high-quality
scientific records who were working abroad.
Our article studies whether a RyC contract afects
the research output of the recipients a few years
later. We analysed the efect of the programme on
the productivity of the selected researchers and com-
pared them with scholars with similar curricular
characteristics that were not awarded a RyC con-
tract. We employed two alternative approaches to
estimate the causal efect of the contract: conditional
regression and matching procedures. Overal, the
results provided by the two methods are similar.
They indicate that the RyC contract alowed their
recipients to achieve a quality level above that of
comparable applicants not selected by the pro-
gramme, both in terms of the quantity (number of
papers) and, more importantly, the quality (average
and maximum impact). This is an important result,
which supports policies designed to increase the
stock of human resources in scientific research to
raise the international impact of the Spanish R&D
system.
The programme also had favourable efects on the
Spanish S&T system. We have summarized the con-
tributions of previous researchers who established
that the programme has earned a solid reputation
abroad and increased the chances of PRCs with solid
reputations to atract high-quality young researchers.
It has also provided short-term improvements in the
employment opportunities, working conditions and
academic career prospects of PhDs.
However, in recent years, the S&T system has
failed to provide employment opportunities for al
of the researchers who, in the spirit of a tenure-track
position, were evaluated positively at the end of the
RyC contract. The first researchers selected finished
their contracts in 2007, coinciding with the begin-
ning of the Spanish economic crisis. This has limited
many of these researchers’prospects within the
Spanish S&T system, jeopardizing the programme’s
achievements in previous years. This has generated a
perception that Spain has shifted from aiming at
‘premier league’status (Schiermeier2004)to‘’scien-
tific suicide’(Moro-Martin2012). Even though the
number of contracts has been substantialy reduced
in the last cals, the RyC programme has been main-
tained even in the aftermath of the crisis. It is widely
Table 5.Percentage causal efect of the contract (relative to
the outcome at the time of application).
Naive Regression Matching
Outcome
Number of papers 61.40*** 19.63*** 26.53**
Average IF 53.91*** 15.36*** 16.85***
Maximum IF 53.23*** 9.72* 15.37***
Rank average IF 36.88*** 9.70** 10.37**
Rank maximum IF 36.51*** 9.75** 9.48**
See notes toTables 3and4.
The reference value is the average of the outcome variable at time of
application.
10The variable gender was missing for a fraction of our sample, so that we have prefered to report the results with the large sample size, thus excluding
gender.
11The efect of the contract on the number of papers remains positive and significant, with estimated coeficients between 0.94 and 1.24 for regression and
matching, respectively. We also find positive estimated efects of 0.22 and 0.72 for the coresponding average and maximum impact factor. The estimated
efect on the rank measures is also positive and significant, amounting to 6 percentiles across the distribution of impacts.
12The estimated efects on both the number of papers and the diferent quality measures are significantly positive for physics, earth sciences, chemistry and
agriculture. These four areas represent almost 60% of the applications and more than half of the contracts, among experimental areas. In the case of
medicine and engineering (the other two experimental areas) and in the non-experimental areas, we do not find significant efects. Overal, the reported
ful sample results are mostly driven by the aforementioned experimental areas.
acknowledged by the main political parties that this
programme must be kept. Our results provide
insightful evidence about the benefits of the pro-
gramme, particularly increasing the scientific impact
of Spanish PRCs.
Our results are mainly limited by the data char-
acteristics. On one side, they are not experimental
but administrative data. On the other side, we are
not certain about the status, in the four years after
the cal, of those non-granted researchers who are
comparable with the beneficiaries. However, as we
have documented earlier, they are most likely to
remain linked to the PRCs in the evaluation period.
The programme is expected to have further posi-
tive efects beyond the increase in productivity of the
beneficiaries. In particular, it would be interesting to
study the spilover efects of the contracts on the
scientific production of the PRCs. This is a promis-
ing extension that would require additional indivi-
dual information of the researchers within PRCs to
which the beneficiaries are afiliated.
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Table A2.Research areas and its corespondence with ANEP
classification.
Area ANEP classification
Physics Physics and space sciences (1)
Earth sciences & ecology Earth sciences (2)
Plant and animal biology, ecology (6)
Chemistry Science and technology of materials (3)
Chemistry (4)
Chemical technology (5)
Agriculture, livestock &
fishery
Agriculture (7)
Livestock and fishery (8)
Food science and technology (9)
Biomedical sciences Molecular and cel biology and genetics
(10)
Physiology and pharmacology (11)
Medicine (12)
Engineering and computing
science
Mechanical, ship and aeronautical
engineering (13)
Electric and electronic engineering (14)
Civil engineering and architecture (15)
Computing sciences and computer
technology (17)
Electronic and communications
technology (18)
Mathematics Mathematics (16)
Economics Economics, finance and business (19)
Social sciences & law Law (20)
Social sciences (21)
Psychology and education sciences (22)
Arts & humanities Philology and philosophy (23)
History and art (24)
